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Perpetually evolving divergent trading strategies is the natural consequence of a market
with idiosyncratic private information. In the face of intrinsic uncertainty about other
traders’ strategies, participants resort to learning and adaptation to identify and exploit
profitable trading opportunities. Model-consistent use of market-based information generally
improves price performance but can inadvertently produce episodes of sudden mispricing.
The paper examines the impact of trader’s use of information and bounded rationality on
price efficiency.
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Financial markets exhibit extraordinary diversity in investor trading strategies. Widespread
among traders are attempts to extract rent through market participation. Vigorous trading
and extensive market commentary suggests a lack of uniformity among market participants and
possible disagreement as to the true price determination process.
This paper explores a process by which reasonable data-driven adaptation and learning by
market participants shape market evolution. The developed model places traders into an im-
perfect information environment in which the rational expectations equilibrium is analytically
inaccessible to the traders for its dependence on a hidden endogenous state variable. An opti-
mizing approach has traders update trading strategies through learning and adaptation. The
process can continue without end due to the model’s absence of a fixed point. In the developed
setting market-based strategies have a role, potentially improving market efficiency, in extract-
ing information from market observables. To the market’s potential detriment, while they are
able to trade profitably, the traders lack all of the information necessary to employ the market
information without error and without potentially distorting the market price.
The financial market setting draws on models of divergent beliefs, learning, and adaptive
behavior in financial markets. Foundational investigations such as Hellwig (1980) and Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) considered the role of markets in aggregating and filtering information and
the equilibrium implications of the market participants trading on others’ private information
extracted from the market. Investigations such as Frankel and Froot (1990), De Long et al.
(1990a), and De Long et al. (1990b), consider the possible sustainability of multiple beliefs
in static settings. Subsequent analysis considered heterogeneous traders in dynamic settings
that endogenize current market impact. One approach has traders choose between discrete
information options based on past performance. For the models developed in Brock and LeBaron
(1996), Brock and Hommes (1998), De Grauwe et al. (1993), and Giardina and Bouchaud
(2003), among others, the popularity of a particular information source depend directly on
relative performance. Relative performance determines the innovation in popularity in Sethi
and Franke (1995), Branch and McGough (2008), and Goldbaum (2005).1 Another source of
1Wealth accumulation to those using the particular information or strategy is another mechanism generating
evolution in market impact, as in Chiarella and He (2001), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Chiarella et al. (2006), and
Sciubba (2005). Other mechanisms have been considered as well. Lux (1995), for example, relies on investor
sentiment, Routledge (1999) incorporates dispersion through random encounters, while dispersion occurs over a
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evolution in markets comes from traders updating how they use information in developing a
trading strategy. Statistical learning tools, such as Marcet and Sargent (1989a), Marcet and
Sargent (1989b), and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Non-statistical approaches such as the
genetic algorithms in LeBaron et al. (1999) and Bullard and Duffy (1999) offer mechanisms by
which traders can improve available trading tools, generating evolution in market behavior as
strategies improve, following the lessons suggested by recent past events.
Failure by a fundamental trader dominated market to achieve perfect efficiency creates an
opportunity for market-based traders to extract information from the price. To make the non-
fundamental information viable, models such as developed in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Evans and Ramey (1992), Brock and Hommes (1998), Droste et al. (2002), and Chiarella and
He (2003) offer market-based trading as a low-cost alternative to acquiring the same information
known to an informed group of traders. The alternative approach to information adopted in
this paper handicaps fundamental information with private idiosyncratic noise, as in Brock and
LeBaron (1996), while making contemporaneous the market extraction of the information, as in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). In this environment, market-based trading offer the potential to
take advantage of the market’s filtering properties to gain profitable information not possessed
by any individual fundamentally informed trader. The resulting competitive or even superior
market-based information, achieved without imposition of cost on the private fundamental
information, is, to my knowledge, unique to the developed model.
Market-based trading strategies, particularly low cost trend-following rules, introduce insta-
bility in the dynamic financial market system in Brock and LeBaron (1996), Brock and Hommes
(1998), De Grauwe et al. (1993), Giardina and Bouchaud (2003), Goldbaum (2003), Lux (1998),
and Panchenko et al. (2013). In contrast, for the developed model in which market-based infor-
mation is capable of generating profits while improving market efficiency, the model captures
an environment inherently supportive of traders’ use of market-based information. Model mis-
pricing is thus not hardwired into the market-based trading strategy. Mispricing arises only
circumstantially when traders, for historical or path dependent reasons, use market-based in-
formation inappropriately for the particular realized state.
What the modeled traders do not know for certain is how to interpret the market informa-
tion. Addressing this uncertainty is confounded by the self-referential aspect of beliefs and by
network in Panchenko et al. (2013).
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the model’s state-dependent mapping between market observables and investment fundamen-
tals. The former can be overcome with a convergent learning process but only in the absence
of continued evolution in the latter.2 Following Goldbaum and Panchenko (2010), the analysis
points to the role of the process governing the population dynamics in shaping market behavior.
The presence of the fixed point anchors the asymptotic behavior of the market. The interac-
tion between the self-referential learning and the adaptive behavior can be either a source of
asymptotic stability or instability in the absence of a fixed point.
Boundedly rational behavior is a common feature of models exploring trader heterogeneity,
divergent beliefs, and learning. Analysis of the model includes an exploration of bounded ratio-
nality imposed through memory length. Brock and LeBaron (1996) and LeBaron et al. (1999)
highlight the stabilizing influence of long memory on the dynamic system. Long memory, for
example, helps to stabilize the inherently destabilizing cobweb model in Branch and McGough
(2008) to produce asymptotically similar behavior between the replicator dynamic (RD) and
the discrete choice dynamic (DCD) processes.
Incorporating individual rationality of an agent unaware of the correct model, the misspec-
ified equilibrium of Branch and Evans (2006) and the mixed expectations equilibrium of Guse
(2010) both describe a fixed point supporting heterogeneous beliefs. The bounded rationality
appears in the form of an under-parameterized model that nonetheless appears consistent with
the actual law of motion.3 Goldbaum (2006) imposes constraints consistent with a rational
expectations equilibrium solution on the traders’ behavior, though the solution itself is hidden.
Relaxing these rationality restrictions and incorporating other boundedly rational behavior in-
troduces a variety of mechanisms through which mispricing arises.
The analysis of this paper offers new insight into the market consequences of imperfect id-
iosyncratic information by analytically extending the model in Goldbaum (2006) and developing
a number of new application treatments. The model is attractive for supporting divergent beliefs
without arbitrary costs or limitations on choice. Explored are the role of dynamic processes,
bounded rationality, and memory in shaping near term evolution and asymptotic behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the structure of the
2Bullard (1994), Bullard and Duffy (2001), and Chiarella and He (2003) offer examples with non-convergence
in learning.
3The mis-specification of the under-parameterized minimum squared variance model is absorbed into the error
term. In Guse (2010), the mis-specified model persists supported by a cost advantage.
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financial market, trader behavior, and the available information. Also developed in the section
is a rational expectations equilibrium as it depends on a hidden endogenous state variable for
reference against which to compare market price and beliefs under boundedly rational settings.
Both the replicator and discrete choice dynamic models for driving the state variable are evalu-
ated. A model of trader learning is also developed. Different notions of bounded rationality as
they may apply to traders in the financial market are discussed in this section as well. Section
3 offers computation analysis of the market, highlighting the interactions between the state
variable, learning, and rationality. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 The Model
Analysis of the model reveals that an equilibrium cannot be achieved with traders employing
fundamental information alone. There is a role for market-based information in support of
portfolio decisions. With divergent beliefs, the relationship between the price and payoff is
found to depend on the unobserved extent to which traders rely on fundamental versus market-
based information. A dynamic model is developed based on traders estimating the relationship.
2.1 Information and model development
A large population of N traders trade a risky dividend-paying asset and a risk-free bond paying
R. The risky asset can be purchased at price pt in period t and is subsequently sold at price
pt+1 after paying the holder dividend dt+1 in period t + 1. The dividend process follows an
exogenous AR(1) process
dt+1 = φdt + t+1, φ ∈ (0, 1) (1)
normalized to mean zero with innovations distributed t ∼ IIDN(0, σ2 ). Available to the traders
for time t trading is a combination of public and private fundamental information as well as
market-based information,
Zit = {sit, pt, dt, pt−1, dt−1, . . . }.
The dividend dt is paid at the start of the period and its value is public knowledge at the time
of trade. The Walrasian price pt is not yet realized but can be conditioned on when the trader
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submits a demand function. Each trader has access to a private idiosyncratically noisy signal,
sit, centered on next period’s dividend,
sit = dt+1 + eit (2)
eit ∼ IIDN(0, σ2e).
In forming demand for the risky asset, traders use available information to forecast the future
payoff, pt+1+dt+1. The population is heterogeneous in how much weight to place on fundamental
versus market-based information. The proper balance turns out to be state dependent and
hidden so that the selective use of information will be consistent with the developed model. At
one extreme for trader type, the “fundamental” trader completely discounts market variables
as a source of useful information, relying entirely on pubic and private fundamental information
to form expectations. At the other extreme, the “market-based” trader uses public information




ZFit = {sit, dt, dt−1, . . . }
ZMit = Z
M
t = {pt, dt, pt−1dt−1, . . . }.
Traders choose between these two extreme positions.4
The equity demand component of the agents’ optimal control problem collapses to a spot
market decision with negative exponential utility. Given prices {pt}∞t=0, optimal equity demand
is given by
qˆkit(pt) = (E(pt+1 + dt+1|Zkit)−Rpt)/γσ2kt, k = F,M and for all t (3)
with σ2kt = Varit(pt+1 + dt+1|Zkit). The competitive equilibrium consists of a population of
N = NFt + N
M
t optimizing traders and a price series {pt}∞t=0 that clears the spot market in
equities in each period.
4Alternatively, allow every trader use of Zit. There is no REE solution as the trader should optimally ignore
the private signal and rely on pt to extract dt+1, a strategy that is inconsistent with an informative price if
universally employed. See Goldbaum (2006) for the derivation and for simulations based on this alternate model.
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R− φ ((1− α)φdt + αdt+1) (4)
with α ∈ [0, 1].5 Iterated expectations applied to (1) and (4) produce the fundamental infor-
mation based forecast of the excess payoff to the risky asset,






Independence of the expected payoff from α is convenient from a modeling perspective as
the market clearing price is robust to the trader’s belief, right or wrong, rational or irrational,
regarding the value α. A deficiency in the fundamental understanding of the price process
captured by ignorance of the particular value of α does not impact the market. A modeling
choice to impose or relax rationality through α does not affect demand for the risky asset.
Beliefs that deviate from (4) do affect the market.
Fundamental traders project dt+1 on their available Z
F
it information, obtaining the mean
squared error minimizing forecast with
E(dt+1|ZFit ) = (1− β)φdt + βsit (6)




e). Thus, fundamental traders’ uncertainty, the consequence of awareness
of the idiosyncratic component of their signal, leads to fundamental trader reliance on dt when
forecasting dt+1.
The market-based traders employ a forecasting model that is linear in all relevant variables
consistent to forecasting the following period’s payoff,
E(pt+1 + dt+1|ZMt ) = c0t + c1tpt + c2tdt. (7)
Let qkt be the average demand of the population of type k traders, k = F,M . Based on
5The fundamental trader belief is supported by an initial guess of an unconstrained linear price, pt = b0+b1dt+
b2dt+1, subsequently verified by the market clearing solution expressed in (11) - (13). The equilibrium-consistent
market-based trader belief, including (23), produce the zero intercept and constrained coefficients incorporated
into (4).
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R− φ((1− β)φdt + βdt+1)−Rpt
)
/γσ2Ft, (8)
qMt = (c0t + c2tdt − (R− c1t)pt)/γσ2Mt. (9)
Though no individual fundamental trader knows the value of dt+1, it is reflected in q
F
t without
noise as aggregation filters the idiosyncratic component of sit. With portion nt of traders
using the fundamental approach and 1−nt employing the market-based approach, a consistent
Walrasian price function is
pt = pt(nt, ct) = b0t + b1t(nt, ct)dt + b2t(nt, ct)dt+1 (10)
in which ct represents a vector of the coefficients in (7). The coefficients of (10) solve the market
clearing condition, ntq
F
t + (1− nt)qMt = 0 at
b0(nt, ct) =
c0t(1− nt)κ2t





R−φ(1− β)φ+ (1− nt)c2tκ2t






ntR+ (1− nt)(R− c1t)κ2t
(13)
where κt = σFt/σMt.
The extent to which the market clearing price reflects the public dt or the private dt+1
depends on the confidence of the fundamental traders in their signal (β), the beliefs of the
market-based traders about the relationship between market observables and future payoffs
(c0t, c1t, c2t), the traders’ relative uncertainties in predicting future payoffs (κ
2
t ), and the pro-
portion of the market employing the fundamental strategy (nt). Naturally, also present in the
price coefficients are the opportunity cost of investing in the risky asset (R) and the AR(1)
coefficient of the dividend process (φ).
Let pˆikt represent the performance measure associated with type k strategy using information
up to the realizations of time t dividends. With each fundamental trader trading based on
6Formally, qFt = R(((1− β)φdt + β(dt+1 + 1ntN
∑
eit))/(R − φ)− pt)/γσ2Ft but with a large ntN population
of fundamental traders, the last term is approximately zero.
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idiosyncratic information, pˆiFt is the average of the fundamental population. Two processes for
governing how popularity evolves in response to performance differentials are considered for how
they alter the long run and evolutionary processes of the system. Let innovation population
dynamic (IPD) identify the set of processes in which the performance differential determines
the innovation in popularity. The example adopted for analysis is the 2-choice version of the
more general K choice replicator dynamic (RD) model found in Branch and McGough (2008).
The model generates the transition equation
nt+1 = g(pˆi
F




t − pˆiMt )(1− nt) for pˆiFt ≥ pˆiMt
nt + r(pˆi
F
t − pˆiMt )nt for pˆiFt < pˆiMt
(14)
with
r(x) = tanh(δx/2) (15)
driving the nt process. Unlike its biological origins, the RD as employed need not be absorbing
at the boundaries. According to (14), estimates of superior performance by the counterfactual
strategy move the population away from the boundary.7
Let level population dynamic (LPD) identify the set of processes in which the performance
differential determines the level of popularity. The example adopted for analysis is the dis-
crete choice dynamics (DCD) process, employed in Brock and Hommes (1998), which identifies
popularity as a direct function of the performance differential,
nt+1 = f(pˆi
F
t − pˆiMt ) =
1
2
(1 + tanh(ρ(pˆiFt − pˆiMt )/2)). (16)
The parameters δ and ρ play similar roles in setting the sensitivity of the trader population
to the magnitude of pˆiFt − pˆiMt . Under the RD process, the more successful strategy attracts
adherents from the less successful strategy, consistent with the process described in Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980). Under the DCD, pˆiFt − pˆiMt maps directly into nt with the superior strategy
always employed by the majority of the population.
Conditional variance, σ2kt = Varit(pt+1 + dt+1|Zkit), is derived using (10) and the appropriate
7Parke and Waters (2007) and Guse (2010) have to contend with absorbing boundary conditions. The bound-
aries of the present model are shown to be reflective.
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(5) or (7) with,
pt+1 + dt+1 − E(pt+1 + dt+1|ZFit ) =
(










+b2t+1t+2 − β R
R− φeit (17)
pt+1 + dt+1 − E(pt+1 + dt+1|ZMt ) = (φ(1 + b1t+1 + φb2t+1)− c1t(b1t+1 + φb2t+1)− c2t)dt
+(1 + b1t+1 + φb2t+1 − c1tb2t+1))t+1 + b2t+1t+2. (18)
In the order in which they appear in (17), fundamental trader error arrises (i) when the market
misprices dividends, (ii) as a result of down-weighting private information about the future
dividend due to the noise in the signal, (iii) the unobservable et+2 component of pt+1, and
(iv) the realized idiosyncratic noise. Market based trader error arrises as a consequence of (i)
inconsistence between c1t and c2t, (ii) misinterpretation of the market information through error
in c1t, and (iii) the unobservable et+2 component of pt+1. The developed analytical solution will
identify conditions under which certain sources of error can be eliminated.
2.2 Solution
The market-based traders are capable of possessing correct beliefs consistent with the actual
pricing function (10).
Definition 1. An nt-dependent Rational Expectations Equilibrium describes a market in which
the coefficients of the market-based strategy in (7) correctly reflect the projection of pt+1+dt+1
on dt and pt. Further, the fundamental strategy employs beliefs about the price function
consistent with (4) and forecast dividends according to (6).
Recall κ2 = σ2F /σ
2
M . The nt-dependent Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE(nt)) solu-
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tion is the b2 and κ
2 that solve (21) and (24) of the following so that, for nt ∈ (0, 1],
p∗t = p
∗







(R− φ) (nt + (1− nt)κ∗(nt)2) (20)
b∗2(nt) =
ntβ + (1− nt)κ∗(nt)2







nt + (1− nt)κ∗(nt)2
)
































As nt → 0, then b∗1(nt)→ 0, b∗2(nt)→ 1/(R+ φ), c∗1(nt)→ R, and c∗2(nt)→ 0. For nt = 0, then
b∗1(0) = φ/(R− φ), b∗2(0) = 0 as derived from the consistent solution c∗1(0) = 0 and c∗2(0) = R.
Accepting the partition of information into fundamental and market-based, the REE(nt)
deviates from a true rational expectations equilibrium in that the derived market-based traders’
beliefs at the REE(nt) relies on treating expectations of all future nτ , τ ≥ t + 1, as a point
estimate unchanging from to the current nt. Deviations would have consequence on the price
stream. A constant nt may or may not be consistent with the process driving nt at the REE(nt)
solution.
Let p0t and p
1
t represent the price at the two information extremes based on the accuracy of
the private signal. With zero content in the signal, with σ →∞, then β = 0. Zero error, with
σ = 0, results in β = 1. For nt 6= 0,8
p0t ≡ p∗t (1)|β=0 =
φ
R− φdt
p1t ≡ p∗t (nt)|β=1 =
1
R− φdt+1.
8Prices p0t and p
1
t also correspond to the Fama (1970) semi-strong and strong form efficient prices.
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Let pFt represent the price at the extreme of a market populated by only fundamental traders.
With nt = 1,
pFt ≡ p∗t (1) =
(1− β)φ
R− φ dt +
β
R− φdt+1. (27)
The opening for profitable employment of the market-based information follows from pFt ∈
[p0t , p
1
t ], introducing predictability in the price as a consequence of dt+1 contributing to the
value of both pt and pt+1. The presence of the market-based traders moves the market towards
the efficient market price, as reflected in p∗t (nt) ∈ [pFt , p1t ] with lim
nt→0
p∗t (nt) = p1t . Since p∗t (0) = p0t
there is a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) type discontinuity at nt = 0.
Observe that b∗1(nt) + φb∗2(nt) = φ/(R− φ)∀nt. Let
α∗t = α
∗(nt) =
ntβ + (1− nt)κ∗(nt)2
nt + (1− nt)κ∗(nt)2 , (28)




R−φ ((1− α∗t )φdt + α∗t dt+1). With α∗t ∈
[β, 1], the REE(nt) price can be interpreted as the present discounted value reflecting the ag-
gregation of the market’s forecast of future dividends. The extent to which the REE(nt) price
reflects the public dt or the private dt+1 depends on the quality of the signal, as reflected in β,
and the traders’ choice of information, as reflected in nt.
Contributing to the robustness of the model, fundamental trader ignorance of nt does not
undermine the existence of the REE(nt) solution. Equivalent to previously identified freedom
from the fundamental traders’ beliefs regarding, the REE(nt) solution requires only that each
fundamental trader holds beliefs regarding price formation consistent with b1t+φb2t = φ/(R−φ),
free from particular knowledge of b1t and b2t individually. Without consequence on the REE(nt)
solution or the market clearing price, each fundamental trader can independently employ the
correct p∗t (nt), mistakenly employ p∗t (mt) for mt 6= nt, or naively employ the pFt , p0t , p1t , or any
other price structure consistent with (4). Given a price realization consistent with (4), accuracy
of the fundamental trader forecast is a reflection of the accuracy of their forecast of dt+1 and is
independent of the believed α.
Useful for consistency of trader behavior when encountering non-equilibrium pricing, the
condition imposed on market-based trader beliefs to ensure b1t + φb2t = φ/(R − φ) is weaker
than the conditions necessary to generate the REE(nt). It only requires c2t = (R−c1t)φ/(R−φ)
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as evidenced by substituting for c2t in (12) to produce b1(nt, c1t) + φb2(nt, c1t) = φ/(R − φ)
regardless of the value of c1t. Thus, the condition c2t = c
∗
2(c1t) implied by (23) is a sufficient
condition to support the price structure underpinning the fundamental strategy. That is, in
order for the fundamental traders’ forecast to conform to the requirements of a REE(nt), the
market-based traders need only employ a c2t value that is REE(nt) consistent with c1t without
necessarily employing the correct REE(nt) implied c1t = c
∗
1(nt).
For c2t = c
∗
2(c1t), all trader beliefs are consistent with the price determination process. For
the market-based traders, error arises from ignorance of nt that leads to errors in estimating
dt+1, not erroneous beliefs about how prices are formed according to nt. In the error terms
expressed in (17) and (18), the market-based traders’ employment of c2t = c
∗
2(c1t) eliminates
the first term of (18) and the resulting b1t + φb2t = φ/(R− φ) eliminates the first term of (17)
as well.
The payoff to the risky asset is never without some level of uncertainty. The closer pt is to
p1t , the more pt+1 reflects the yet unobserved dt+2, increasing the market’s uncertainty about
investing in the risky asset. The same level of uncertainty also arises for nt = 1 and β = 0 or
for nt = 0. In both of these latter cases, pt+1 depends on dt+1 only but no time t trader has
information concerning the value of dt+1.
Realizing the REE(nt) requires that the market-based traders employ ct = c
∗(nt). It is
appropriate to ascertain whether the traders can deduce c∗ analytically from their knowledge
of the market. From (23), c∗2 can be expressed in terms of c∗1. For a known zero net supply
of the risky asset, the traders can derive analytically that c∗0 = 0. For market-based traders
incorporating these two conditions into their understanding of the market, only c∗1 remains to
be derived. From (22), solving for c∗1 requires knowledge of nt. Reasonably, nt is not directly
observable. For an nt that is the endogenous product of a dynamic system, the question becomes
whether some fixed point nfp value can be identified that is consistent with REE(nt).
2.3 Performance
Define performance in terms of individual profit,
pikit = q
k
it(pt+1 + dt+1 −Rpt). (29)
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Using the REE(nt) consistent c0 = 0 and c2t = c
∗
2(c1t), and the market clearing condition for
b2t from (13), (29) generates, for nt ∈ (0, 1],
E(piFt ) = (1− nt)∆t (30)
E(piMt ) = −nt∆t (31)
so that E(piFt − piMt ) = ∆t. Here,
∆t = ∆(c1t, nt) =
(
nt(1− β)R+ (1− nt)(R− c1t)κ2







The REE(nt) expected profit differential, E(pi
∗










That ∆∗(nt) < 0 for all nt 6= 0 reveals the benefit to extracting filtered information from the
REE market over direct access to noisy information. The fundamental traders only profit in
the presence of error in the market-based traders’ model, as c1t deviates sufficiently from c
∗
1(nt),
allowing ∆t to be positive.
A fixed point to the entire dynamic system requires the REE(nt) solution combined with
a fixed point to the population process. The fixed point condition depends on the population
regime.
Proposition 1. Given a level population dynamic (LPD) for nt, the REE(nt) competitive
equilibrium has a unique fixed point nfp at which nfp = f(∆∗(nfp)) .
Proof. Under the LPD population process, nt+1 = f(pˆi
F
t − pˆiMt ) according to (16) and at the
REE(nt), pˆi
F
t − pˆiMt = ∆∗(nt) . For ρ < ∞, f(x) is continuous and monotonically increasing
in x. A fixed point solution is nfp such that nfp = f(∆∗(nfp)). Since lim
nt→0
∆∗(nt) = 0 and
∆∗(nt) is monotonically decreasing as nt increases to one, a unique nfp, 0 < nfp ≤ 1/2, such
that nfp = f(∆∗(nfp)) exists.
Figure 1 captures the existence of the fixed point under the DCD population process. Since
the slope of f(x) |x=0 increases with ρ in Figure 1, the value of nfp ∈ (0, 1/2] decreases with
increasing ρ. At the extremes, ρ = 0 results in a horizontal f(piF − piM ) and nfp = 1/2 while
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Figure 1: nfp for DCD population dynamics.
ρ→∞ approaches a step function in f(piF −piM ) so that nfp → 0. With E(piFfp−piMfp) < 0, the
inferior profits of the fundamental strategy at nfp support the realization of nfp < 1/2. The
DCD fixed point is inconsistent with the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) notion of an equilibrium
in which the expected performance differential is zero.
Proposition 2. Given an innovation population dynamic (IPD) for nt, the REE(nt) competi-
tive equilibrium excludes a fixed point in nt.
Proof. Under the IPD population process, the fixed point condition requires the existence of
an nfp such that nfp = g(∆∗(nfp), nfp). With n = g(∆, n) if and only if ∆ = 0, the fixed
point requires ∆∗(nfp) = 0. Since no such nfp exists, there can be no fixed point to the RD
population process.
The existence of an REE depends on the existence of a (nfp, c1) combination for which
nfp = n∗(c∗1(nfp)). Such a point does not exist since for c1t = c∗1(nt), ∆∗(nt) < 0 for all
nt ∈ (0, 1] and E(piFt − piMt ) > 0 for nt = 0. The Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) discontinuity
means that the nt = 0 boundary is reflecting rather than absorbing.
2.4 Learning
Consider a fixed nt = n ∈ (0, 1] for all t. Allow traders to update the market-based model based
on empirical observations. Least-squares learning involves a process of updating the coefficients
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of (7) according to
cˆt = cˆt−1 + λt(Q−1t xt−2(pt−1 + dt−1 − cˆt−1xt−2))′ (34)
Qˆt = Qˆt−1 + λt(xt−1x
′
t−1 − Qˆt−1) (35)
with λt = 1/t and xt = {1, pt, dt}. Here, cˆt reflects the time t estimate of the corresponding
coefficient of (7) based on the learning algorithm while Qˆt is the estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix for xt used in the estimation of cˆt.
Proposition 3. Given a fixed n, σ2kt = σ
2
k(n, ct), a sequence of market clearing prices {pt}∞t=0,
and least squares updating of beliefs and performance, the REE(n) competitive equilibrium is
locally stable.
Proof. See Appendix
By Proposition 3, the self-referencing system of prices and beliefs is locally stable at the
REE(n) under least-squares learning. As the fixed point to the learning process, c∗(n) are
the rational expectations coefficients for the market-based traders and REE(n) is a rational
expectations equilibrium for market-based traders.
The parameters λt regulates the learning process. With λt = 1/t, the traders update the
market-based model consistent with the standard least-squares learning algorithm of Marcet
and Sargent (1989b), giving equal weight to each observation. Least-squares learning is a
natural choice for the traders given a fixed hidden state variable. The perpetually evolving
state of the RD processes can make other parameter updating processes seem reasonable. For
λt = λ, 0 < λ < 1, the traders update with a constant gain by which the contribution of past
observations to the current parameter estimate decays exponentially.
The variables included in the vector xt can be adapted to the presumed rationality of
the market-based traders. Imposing c0t = 0 and c2t = c
∗
2(c1t), xt becomes a scalar, xt =
pt − φdt/(R− φ).
Allowing nt to evolve over time imposes on the traders a need to estimate other nt-dependent
variables as accommodation to the inability of the traders to derive the values analytically.
Traders need to estimate both piFt and pi
M
t as inputs to the model adoption decision. Each
trader must also estimate the σ2kt, k ∈ {F,M}, appropriate for the model adopted as an input
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to demand. Consider the updating algorithms
σˆ2kt = σˆ
2





t−1 − pˆikt−1), k = F,M (37)
Like λt, the parameters θt and µt regulate the learning process. Under least-squares learning,




t are simple sample averages of all past observations. A constant
gain biases weight towards the more recent observations.
2.5 Evolution without a Fixed Point
Imposing the constraints c0t = c
∗
0 = 0 and cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t) of the REE(nt) solution, the system,
represented by equations (1), (10), (14), (34), (35) and (37), can be evaluated using phase space
dynamics in the (c1, n) plane. The phase space analysis is facilitated by imposing µt = µ = 1
in (37) so that the time t realization of piF (c1t, nt)− piM (c1t, nt) alone identifies nt+1. Though
not accessible to the traders, let σˆ2tk = σ
∗
k(nt)
2 of (25) and (26) for k ∈ {F,M} so that the
employed conditional variances are correct expressions reflecting the current nt rather than the
history-dependent estimate (36).
Market-based trader beliefs are unchanging if cˆ1t = c
∗
1(nt). At this REE(nt), the market-
based model correctly reflects the relationship between the observables pt and dt and the ex-
pected payoff of the following period, E(pt+1 + dt+1). The function c
∗
1(nt) is monotonically
increasing for 0 < nt ≤ 1 with c∗1(n)→ R for n→ 0 and c∗1(1) = R/β.
The population process is at a steady state if ∆(cˆ1t, nt) = 0. The coefficient c1t appears
twice in the numerator of ∆(cˆ1t, nt). Let c
+
1 (nt) and c
−
1 represent the two functions capturing
combinations of cˆ1t and nt consistent with ∆(cˆ1t, nt) = 0 in (32). For 0 < nt ≤ 1, the former is
monotonically increasing and everywhere above c∗1(nt),
c+1 (nt) = R
(




The latter is a constant, c−1 = R, located below c
∗
1(nt). Expected profits are zero at cˆ1t = c
+
1 (nt)
because the resulting market clearing price is the efficient market price, p1t , at which expected
profits are zero regardless of the individual trader’s position taken in the market. Expected
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Figure 2: Phase space in nt and cˆ1t for the RD population process. c
∗
1(nt) is the REE(nt) value
of cˆ1t and the attractor to the learning process for a given nt. For c
−
1 < cˆ1t < c
+
1 (nt) the market-
based model is sufficiently accurate to earn profits at the expense of the fundamental strategy,
leading to a decline in nt. For cˆ1t < c
−
1 and for c
+
1 (nt) < cˆ1t < c˜1(nt) the fundamental strategy
dominates the market-based strategy so that from these regions nt is increasing. Above c˜1(nt),
the aggregate demand curve for the risky security is upward sloping and no positive price exists
to clear the market. The dashed lines reflect an alternate specification for which the current-
period implication of cˆ1t 6= c∗1(nt) is recognized when calculating the market-based model error.




1, when market-based trader are
increasingly uncertain in the face of large price deviations (developed in Section 2.6.2).
profits are zero at cˆ1t = c
−
1 (nt) because the market traders expect the risky asset to offer the
same return as the risk-free bond and thus there is no trading at the market clearing price.
A third relevant function included in the phase space is c˜1(nt). The expression ntR +
(1 − nt)(R − cˆ1t)κ2t appears in the denominator of the two pricing coefficients, b1(cˆ1t, nt) and
b2(cˆ1t, nt) as well as the denominator of ∆(cˆ1t, nt). The negative of the expression is the slope of
the risky asset’s aggregate demand function so that when it is zero the market demand function
is horizontal and different from zero, producing an infinite market clearing price (based on a








producing ntR+ (1− nt)(R− c˜1(nt))κ2 = 0. For 0 < nt ≤ 1, c˜1(nt) is monotonically increasing
and everywhere above c+1 (nt). Combinations of c1t and nt approaching the function from below
or from the right generate pt(c1t, nt)→∞ and ∆(cˆ1t, nt)→∞.
Above c˜1(nt), the combination of nt and cˆ1t do not allow for a reasonable market clearing
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price. The precarious nature of the market in the vicinity of c˜1(nt) is the consequence of the
excessive influence of the market-based traders. As a group, they have an upward sloping
demand function in price. From the perspective of the market-based traders, an increase in
the price is interpreted as an indication of good news about the underlying dt+1, increasing
demand. At cˆ1t = c
∗
1(nt), the market-based model correctly accounts for the influence of the
market-based trader population on the price. As a consequence, the aggregate demand for the
risky asset remains downward sloping in pt. For cˆ1t > c
∗
1(nt), the market-based model projects
too large a deviation in dt+1 based on the observed pt. The market-based traders thus take too
large a position relative to the underlying reality. For cˆ1t > c˜1(nt), the position produces an
upward-sloping aggregate market demand function.9
The traders themselves cannot be relied upon to recognize dangerous market conditions
introduced by their own belief. Implicit in the trader’s use of cˆ1t is that it is a reasonable
approximation of c1(nt) for the current unobserved nt. For any cˆ1t ∈ (R,R/β] there exists
n1 and n2, 0 < n1 < n2 ≤ 1 for which cˆ1t = c˜1(n1) and cˆ1t = c∗1(n2). The market-based
traders’ belief that c1t = cˆ1t is reasonable if the unobserved nt is near n2 but disastrously
wrong, generating substantial mispricing, if nt is near n1. The greater distances between c
∗
1(nt)
and c+1 (nt) and between c
+




1(nt) is an attractor for cˆ1t. For cˆ1t between c
−
1 (nt) and c
+
1 (nt), E(∆(cˆ1t, nt)) < 0
so that nt tends to decline. In this range, the market-based model, while not necessarily perfectly
correct for extracting information from the price, is more accurate than the average fundamental




1 (nt) < cˆ1t < c˜1(nt),
the inaccuracy in the market-based model is large enough that the user of the fundamental
information expects to earn profits at the expense of the market-based traders and therefore nt
tends to increase in this region.
All four functions of the phase space radiate out from the point nt = 0 and cˆ1t = R but
because of the discontinuity at nt = 0, none take a value of R at nt = 0. Therefore, though the
four functions come arbitrarily close, they never intersect. The failure of c∗1(nt) to intersect with
either c−1 (nt) or c
+
1 (nt) graphically captures the absence of a fixed point to the RD dynamic
9As an alternate interpretation, for cˆ1t > c
∗
1(nt), the market-based model can be seen as underestimating the






How closely the traders adhere to rationality strongly influences the near-term evolution and
asymptotic characteristics of the market. Constraints on the parameters reflect traders making
full use of the information and knowledge of price determination to impose rationality on beliefs
and behavior. Relax these conditions and the market is no longer constrained to exhibit features
of the rational expectations equilibrium. Features of the boundedly rational market are thus
self-fulfilling.
Considered analytically in this section and computationally in the following section are
model treatment variations based on (i) the consequence of allowing cˆ2t 6= c∗2(cˆ1t), both with and
without appropriate accommodation by the fundamental traders, (ii) the presence or absence
of a fixed point as determined by the population process, and (iii) memory length as captured
by λt, and µt.
2.6.1 Knowing fundamental traders
The fundamental traders hold beliefs consistent with the market so long as the market produces
b1t + φb2t = φ/(R− φ). The condition is violated when cˆ2t 6= c∗2(cˆ1t). The disruption to pricing
is profound when the fundamental traders try to incorporate the deviation from proper pricing
into their beliefs.
As previously asserted, traders aware of the market and its structure can deduce that c0 = 0
regardless of the unobservable nt. They may also incorporate a feature of the REE(nt) by
imposing cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t) according to (23). Let b2(nt, cˆ1t) represent the market clearing value of
b2 with cˆ1t set freely but cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t). This REE(nt) constrained b2(nt, cˆ1t) has up to three roots
of which only one is real at any particular value of nt ∈ (0, 1]. Naturally, b1t = φ/(R−φ)−φb2t
completes the pricing equation.
For R < cˆ1t < R/β, Figure 3 includes an example of the b2(nt, cˆ1t) solution. Let n˜ represent
the value of nt such that cˆ1t = c˜1(nt) so that n˜(cˆ1t) = c˜
−1
1 (cˆ1t). For nt ∈ (n˜, 1], b2(nt, cˆ1t) is
increasing as nt declines with b2(nt, cˆ1t) → +∞ as nt → n˜(c1). For the invalid price region
n ∈ (0, n˜), b2(nt, cˆ1t) is negative.
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(a) b(nt, cˆ1t) (b) b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) evaluated at cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t)
(c) b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) evaluated with cˆ2t > c
∗
2(cˆ1t) (d) b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) evaluated with cˆ2t < c
∗
2(cˆ1t)
Figure 3: Real roots of b2(nt, cˆ1t) and b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) in the presence of fundamental traders able
to account for the deviation from b1t + φb2t = φ/(R − φ). R = 1.02, φ = 0.5, and σ = σe = 1.
With c1 = 1.1 then n˜(1.1) = 0.034. The b2(nt, cˆ1t) solution is included in each frame (dashed
line). For cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t), for all values of nt, one of the roots of b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) is equal to the root
of b2(nt, cˆ1t). For cˆ2t > c
∗
2(cˆ1t), the point of tangency that ensures continuity in the roots of
b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) that match the root of b2(nt, cˆ1t) is lost. For cˆ2t < c
∗
2(cˆ1t), a gap opens between
the two points of intersection in two of the roots tracing b2(nt, cˆ1t).
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Market-based traders unaware or uninterested in imposing cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t) introduce deviations
from b1t + φb2t = φ/(R − φ). Consider a sophisticated fundamental trader able to account for
these deviations.10 Let b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) represent the market clearing value of b2 with both cˆ1t and
cˆ2t set freely. The unconstrained b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) has five roots. For nt > nr, where nr ∈ (n˜, 1),
only one of the roots is real. For nt ≤ nr, up to three of the roots are real, producing three
possible market clearing prices.
Figure 3 highlights the challenges in identifying market clearing price produced by this sce-
nario. Rather than imposing market discipline, the sophisticated fundamental traders exploiting
market-based trader error increase intractability with possible multiple market clearing prices
depending on the state.
As seen in frame 3b, evaluated at cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t), one of the three real roots of b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t)
coincides with the real root of b2(nt, cˆ1t). The other two other roots are real for values of
nt ∈ (0.034, 0.22) starting at a single point at nt = 0.22 and bifurcating with one branch
increasing as nt declines and the other decreasing. The denominator of b2(nt, cˆ1t) is linear in
nt, crossing zero once at n˜t. The denominator b2(nt, cˆ1t, cˆ2t) is a binomial in nt and crosses zero
twice. This explains the additional root converging to +∞ as nt → 0.065 from above.
For cˆ2t 6= c∗2(cˆ1t), the three real roots do not always coincide with the constrained solution
for a range of nt. As depicted in frame 3c, for cˆ2t > c
∗
2(cˆ1t), since the roots do not intersect, to
maintain b2(nt, cˆ1t) over the range of nt requires jumping from one root to another. For cˆ2t <
c∗2(cˆ1t) seen in frame 3d, there is a range over which the two roots most closely approximating
b2(nt, cˆ1t) become imaginary. The only remaining real root produces a b2 that declines as nt
declines.
2.6.2 Concurrent conditional variance
Another challenge for the traders is how to evaluate the error associated with forecasting the
payoff, a component of submitted demand. The error variance can be derived analytically
for each forecast strategy only with knowledge of the true nt-dependent pricing relationship.
Equations (25) and (26) capture the REE(nt) values while (36) is driven by the data. The
ratio σ∗F (n)
2/σ∗M (n)
2 is monotonically increasing in n. At the default simulation parameter
10Here, the fundamental traders exploit deviations from b1t + φb2t = φ/(R− φ). To do so, they need to know
the correct α∗(nt), a level of knowledge not granted to them outside of this subsection.
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values considered in Section 3, the ratio ranges from 1.52 to 3.08 for increasing n ∈ (0, 1]. In
simulation, whether the traders employ (25) and (26) or (36) to compute conditional variance
has negligible effect since both estimates track closely to the REE(nt) values.
The inconsequence follows from the fact that in both computations, the conditional variance
is determined independent of the current market realization. By (36), κˆt is determined by events
up to t−1 while (25) and (26) presume a price consistent with REE(nt). Both formulas prevent
the traders from using the current market realization as an input into the uncertainty. With κt
in the denominator of both c+1 and c˜1, an increase in relative uncertainty among the employers
of the market-based strategy decreases the market-based traders’ price impact by decreasing
the size of their position.
To incorporate this uncertainty, allow the traders to incorporate the uncertainty produced
from their own error. For cˆ2t = c
∗
2(cˆ1t), but cˆ1t 6= c∗1(nt), the conditional variances of (25) and
(26) become










σ2M (nt, cˆ1t) =
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reflecting the dependence of the market-based strategy on the accuracy of the employed fore-
cast model parameters. Larger estimates of c1t feed greater market-based trader uncertainty,




1 in Figure 2
reflect the greater stability in the market as each is everywhere above the respective c+1 and c˜1.
There is a value n¯
′
such that for nt > n¯
′
the invalid price region does not exist. Thus, regardless
of how large is cˆ1t > R, there exists a positive market clearing price. Similarly, there is a value
of n+
′
such that for nt > n
+′ the market-based strategy is always profitable.
3 Simulations
Computational analysis reveals properties of the market model not accessible using analytical
tools. Simulations facilitate analysis of the impact of different implementations of bounded
rationality.
Let p1t , the strong-form efficient market price, be the standard against which the market
23
Table 1: Simulation parameter settings
Simulation Figures nt process δ or ρ λ µ cˆ2t σˆ
k
t
1 4 & 5 DCD 10 1/t 1/t c∗2(cˆ1t) exp
2 6 RD 0.01 1/t 1/t c∗2(cˆ1t) exp
3 7 RD 1 1/t 1/t c∗2(cˆ1t) exp
4 8 RD 0.05 1/t 1 c∗2(cˆ1t) σ∗(nt)
5 9 RD 0.01 0.01 1/t c∗2(cˆ1t) exp
6 10 RD 0.01 1/t 1/t estimate exp
Shared Parameters: R = 1.02, φ = 0.5, σ = σe = 1⇒ β = 1/2
price is evaluated. Let |pt − p1t | be the measure of market inefficiency. In general
pt − p1t = (b1t + φb2t − φ/(R− φ))dt + (b2t − 1/(R− φ))εt+1. (42)
Equation (42) reveals two sources of deviation from efficiency. The condition b1t + φb2t =
φ/(R − φ), producing zero for the first term, requires only cˆ2t = c∗2(cˆ1t) without constraint
on cˆ1t. To generate b
∗
2(nt) → 1/(R − φ) in the second term additionally requires cˆ1t = c∗1(nt)
and nt → 0. A non-zero value in the first term indicates market-based trader error induced
mispricing of public and private information. Non-zero values in the second term reflects a failure
by the market to set price to fully reflect dt+1, allowing dt to enter into price determination. As
reference, consider a market populated by only fundament traders. In this case,






All simulations share a starting value, n0 = 0.75 and the parameter values R = 1.02,
φ = 0.5, and σ = σe = 1 so that β = 1/2. Pre-simulation learning on the market-based
model takes place on 200 observations generated using a fixed nt = n0. At these parameters,
Stdev(pFt − p1t ) = 0.96.
Figures 4 through 10 display examples of the evolution of endogenous parameters typical of
the treatment. To aid direct comparison, each figure is based on the same underlying randomly
generated {dt} series.
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3.1 Level population dynamics
The local stability of the fixed point under the DCD implementation of a LPD is assured if the
traders employ µt = 1/t in their performance updating. Figure 4 shows the early convergence
of the system towards the fixed point values of the respective parameter. Figure 5 shows the
asymptotic properties of the convergence. The early evolution includes periods of high volatility
in the pricing error each time cˆ1t > c
+
1 (nt). Asymptotically, the variance of the pricing error
appears uniform as cˆ1t → c∗1(nfp).
Increasing ρ has two effects on the asymptotic position of the market. Increasing ρ decreases
nfp. This moves the point of attraction deeper into a region, increasing the price impact of
market-based model error, as reflected by the narrowing of the distance between c∗1(nt) and
c˜1(nt) in Figure 2. Also, the greater sensitivity to differences in performance increases the
magnitude of the swings in nt around n
fp as a consequence simply of the random dividend
process. The combination increases the time it takes for the market to converge on the fixed
point.
Similar to increasing ρ, shortening memory of past performance also generates large swings
in nt. The difference is that the swings do not decrease with the accumulation of experience. In
order to obtain convergence to the fixed point with µt = 1 requires dampening the population’s
response to observed performance differentials, accomplished here with ρ < 0.5. Otherwise,
without the tempering of response that comes with the accumulation of knowledge, the traders
are incapable of preventing the low realizations of nt that put the market in the invalid price
region.
3.2 Innovation population dynamics
The RD process offers a point of attraction at nt = 0 and cˆ1t = R but not a fixed point. If the
system were able to travel along c∗1(nt) as nt → 0, then the market would produce increasing
price efficiency with pt → p1t .
3.2.1 Baseline
The baseline setting imposes the REE(nt) solution parameter constraints, cˆ0t = 0 and cˆ2t =
c∗2(cˆ1t) on market-based trader behavior. The baseline also employs the long memory of least-
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Figure 4: DCD produces convergence towards a REE(nfp) fixed point with nfp = 0.357. Top
left plots c1t (green), c
∗
1(nt) (red), and c
+
1t(nt) (cyan). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at
φb2t = φ/(R − φ). Lower left plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t . In all frames, dashed lines
indicate fixed point values, c∗1(nfp), b∗2(nfp), and nfp as appropriate.
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Figure 5: DCD asymptotic behavior around a REE(nfp) fixed point with nfp = 0.357. Top left
plots cˆ1t (green) and c
∗
1(nt) (red). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at φb2t = φ/(R − φ).
Lower left plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t . In all frames, dashed lines indicate fixed point
values, c∗1(nfp), b∗2(nfp), and nfp as appropriate.
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squares learning with λt, µt, and θt all set to 1/t. Additionally, a low δ produces a slow
evolution in the population towards the higher performing strategy. These features make the
baseline setting conducive to asymptotic convergence towards the point of attraction. Observed
in Figure 6, the system adheres closely to c∗1(nt) as nt → 0. The estimated cˆ1t remains well
below c˜1(nt), also included in the plot. Despite this apparent success in convergence, the system
fails to produce pt → p1t . The system instead generates clustered volatility in the pricing error
with no indication of increased accuracy over time. The magnitude of the pricing errors coincide
with the magnitude of deviation in φb2t from φ/(R−φ). The b2t deviations, driven by deviations
in cˆ1t from c
∗
1(nt), are not independent across time but instead produce a time-series with a
highly persistent estimated AR(1) coefficient of 0.998.
3.2.2 Responsiveness
Increasing δ generates fairly regular oscillations in nt while preserving an underlying process of
convergence towards the point of attraction. Figure 7 captures this phenomenon. In contrast
to the baseline, the swings in c∗1(nt) are larger than the variance in c1t. The highly responsive
population produces exaggerated changes in the relative popularity of the two strategies. These
changes outpace the slow improvement in cˆ1t as t becomes large.
Major price disruptions occur when there is a mis-match between cˆ1t and nt. The swings
produced by a large δ would seem to invite such outcomes but instances fail to materialize.
Convergence continues without major price disruptions because the system self-regulates the
rate of decline in nt so that it does not outpace the rate of adjustment in cˆ1t. Also, the incre-
mental changes in nt within the cycles are relatively small, so that the system delivers feedback
of an inconsistency between believes and nt through the profits awarded to the fundamental
traders without nt ever getting too far out of line with beliefs.
3.2.3 Memory in performance
The simulation presented in Figure 8 substitutes µt = 1 for the long memory of µt = 1/t.
With this change, the treatment closely resembles the model analyzed using the phase space
presented in Figure 2.11 Short memory halts the convergence of nt towards zero, with nt instead
11To make the comparison complete, and with no discernible impact on the simulations, the traders measure
conditional variance using (25) and (26) rather than the experience-driven (36).
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Figure 6: Baseline RD produces smooth convergence nt → 0 with cˆ1t → c∗1(nt). Top left
plots cˆ1t (green), c
∗
1(nt) (red), and c˜1t(nt) (blue). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at
φb2t = φ/(R− φ). Lower left plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t .
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Figure 7: RD with high sensitivity to performance, with δ = 1, produces oscillations in nt
overlaying its general decreasing trend. Top left plots cˆ1t (green), c
∗
1(nt) (red), and c˜1t(nt)
(blue). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at φb2t = φ/(R − φ). Lower left plots nt. Lower
right plots pt − p1t .
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hovering around 0.39. At time t, the dt+2 component of pt+1 remains unpredicted by the market.
Payoffs are thus not perfectly forecastable. With a short memory, profit realizations from the
unpredictable component of pt+1 generate large incremental movement in nt. This movement
undermine the learning of cˆ1t and ultimately the convergence of nt. With large jumps in nt,
incompatibility between nt and cˆ1t arise without prior performance feedback that could prevent
the over-use of the market-based model.
While both increasing δ and shortening memory for performance tend to increase swings in
nt, each acts differently on the system. As observed, increasing δ generates cycles in nt that
impact pricing but do not threaten large pricing errors, asymptotically. Short memory produces
sudden jumps in nt rather than smooth swings. Substantial price errors occur when a suddenly
low nt is incompatible with the concurrent cˆ1t. With short memory a permanent feature of
the population, these instances of pricing error do not decline with accumulated experience and
thus are a permanent hinderance to convergence.
The stabilization of the system around a fixed n gives the system the appearance of pos-
sessing a fixed point in the underlying dynamic system, similar to that produced by a LPD
process.
3.2.4 Memory in model
A constant gain in the updating of the market-based model parameters ensures persistence of
error in the market-based model. With λt = 0.01, Figure 9 reveals that after a period of learning,
cˆ1t settles into a stable distribution relative to c
∗
1(nt), moving over time to track the slow
evolution in c∗1(nt). For sufficiently large nt, the narrow distribution in cˆ1t favors the market-
based model. The constant gain becomes a liability as nt converges towards zero, the distribution




1 . The resulting mispricing rewards
the fundamental model, reversing the progress in nt. The measured pˆi
F−pˆiM remains positive for
some time after the return to near-fundamental pricing until the accumulation of small profits
earned by the market-based strategy outweighs the substantial fundamental trader profit earned
during the period of mispricing.
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Figure 8: RD with µt = 1 stabilizes n at a value above zero. The estimate cˆ1t is stable over
time while c∗1(nt) fluctuates rapidly with the fluctuations in nt. Top left plots cˆ1t (green), c∗1(nt)
(red), and c+1t(nt) (cyan). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at φb2t = φ/(R− φ). Lower left
plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t .
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Figure 9: RD with λt = 0.01 generating small but consistent model error that produces long
periods of near efficient pricing with inevitable bursts of mispricing. Top left plots cˆ1t (green),
c∗1(nt) (red), c
+
1t(nt) (cyan), and c˜1t(nt) (blue). Top right plots φb2t with a solid line at φb2t =
φ/(R− φ). Lower left plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t .
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3.2.5 REE(nt) conditions
Relax the rationality of the trader by decoupling cˆ2t from c
∗
2(cˆ1t) so that the market-based strat-
egy estimates both c1t and c2t through the learning process of (34) and (35). The consequences
are twofold. Possible inconsistency in trader estimation such that c2t 6= c∗2(c1t) is a source of
error to the market-based model, resulting in a nonzero coefficient on dt in (18), that feeds back
into the price such that b1t + φb2t 6= φ/(R − φ). The result is a non-zero coefficient on the
first term of the price deviation equation, (42). That b1t + φb2t 6= φ/(R − φ) also undermines
the fundamental traders’ understanding of price formation as they rely on this feature of price
in forming expectations. The consequence of b1t + φb2t 6= φ/(R − φ) is also reflected in the
conditional forecast error in (17) producing non-zero coefficient on φdt.
Figure 10 includes frames for cˆ2t on the left and of b1t + φb2t on the right. The setting
preserves the steady decline in nt, suggesting continued improved accuracy in the market-based
model despite the need to estimate two parameters with only minimal hindrance. Relative to
the base simulation, price deviations from the efficient price show greater volatility with greater
clustering that coincides with deviations from bt1 + φb2t = φ/(R− φ) and φb2t = φ/(R− φ).
4 Conclusion
The developed market model contains a tension between a strategy of relying on imperfect
fundamental information and that of seeking to optimally exploit the information content of
market phenomena. Unique to this model, the market-based alternative to the fundamental
information is capable of earning a profit while improving market efficiency. The finding is that
the market cannot support exclusive use of a single information source in equilibrium. Em-
ploying both fundamental and market information is supported, either as equilibrium behavior
that tolerates unequal return performance or in a perpetual state of disequilibrium produced by
profit-chasing behavior. The latter is found to be capable of producing substantial pricing error,
depending on the behavior of the market participants. Data overcomes deficiencies in trader
knowledge when traders rely on increasingly long histories to inform their decisions, producing
a well-behaved, though not necessarily efficient, market. Regimes in which traders place greater
emphasis on more recent outcomes undermine market efficiency and allow other deficiencies to
affect the price. Responding to recent performance differentials also masks the differences in
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Figure 10: RD with cˆ2t allowed to differ from c
∗
2(cˆ1t) producing error in the pricing of observable
and unobservable components of price. Top left plots cˆ1t (green) and c
∗
1(nt) (red). Top right
plots φb2t with a solid line at φb2t = φ/(R − φ). Middle left plots cˆ2t (green) and c∗2(nt) (red).
Middle right plots b1 + φb2t. Lower left plots nt. Lower right plots pt − p1t .
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the underlying process driving popularity as the system seems to settle around a fixed mix of
fundamental and market-based traders independent of the process.
How closely agents adhere to the constraints imposed by rationality alters the behavior of the
market. Greater rationality among the market-based traders improves their ability to extract
information from the price and improves market performance. Limits on learning may improve
near-term performance in a given state but leads to evolution in the state that prevents the
market from achieving anything approaching asymptotic efficiency. Greater rationality among
the fundamental traders has the potential to undermine market performance to the extent that
it builds on inconsistencies already present in the market-based trader behavior.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Under the regularity conditions (see Marcet and Sargent (1989b), p342-343), the stability
of the learning process with λt = 1/t can be established from the stability of T (c) − c where










so that, according to (13),
T (c1) =
nR+ (1− n)(R− c1)κ2
nβ
and
T (c2) = − φ
R− φ
(
nR(1− β) + (1− n)(R− c1)κ2
nβ
)
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, ∂[T (c)−c]∂c , are
{
−1, −1− 1−nn 1βκ2
}
, which are both
less than zero. The learning process is thus locally stable so that Pr(|ct − c∗| > ψ) a−→ 0 for
ψ > 0.
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